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ABSTRACT: Traditional human-centred epistemologies have failed to adequately address the 
question, ‘How are cognition and knowledge possible?’  Naturalistic epistemologies, however, 
and in particular, evolutionary, biosemiotic, and autopoeitic approaches, have recognized that 
humans are not the only knowers, perceivers, cognizers and rememberers in nature, and thus 
ask instead, ‘How does nature make cognition and knowledge possible?’ thereby reconceiving 
epistemology as study of the cognition and experience of living, embodied, interacting and inter-
signifying natural beings.  Nonetheless, their insights into how nature makes knowledge (and other 
epistemological achievements) possible, while instructive, typically are incomplete – in most 
cases because key aspects of the peculiar physical/causal dynamics of cognitive processes and 
their causal/functional roles in the lives of organisms, are insufficiently considered.  This paper 
seeks to redress this situation, to provide a clearer understanding of how nature makes 
knowledge (and other epistemological processes and achievements) possible.  
The argument draws upon insights of the approaches mentioned, and upon studies of 
biological hierarchy, natural emergence, complex causal dynamics and hierarchically 
structured causal processes, to show that nature’s “inventions” of non-linear causation and 
cybernetic process-modulation led to the emergence of novel systems whose sensitivity to ultra-
low-energy signals (for example, just a few molecules of a chemical compound) radically 
enhances their viability by producing a non-linear hierarchically ordered cascade of adaptive 
activity peculiarly associated with the signal type.  This is biosemiosis.  It is argued that the 
unique causal character of biosemiotic processes is not only their physical “signature”, but is 
essential to subsequently emergent cognitive processes and achievements and their functions, 
and indeed to the biological functions of the organic processes that make life possible.  This is 
a further reason (if further reason were needed) for holding biosemiosis to be, ontologically, a 
natural kind.  Indeed, an understanding of the distinctive causal/functional character of 
biosemiosis is the key to understanding how nature makes possible not only knowledge (and all 
other epistemological processes and achievements) but also, by those semiotic means, life itself.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION: HOW IS KNOWLEDGE POSSIBLE?   
(a) Outline of the argument 
In asking how knowledge is possible, the Western philosophical tradition considered 
only how knowledge is possible for us, ignoring the myriad other species of knowers, 
perceivers, cognizers and rememberers in nature.  I will argue that to understand how 
our knowledge is possible requires that we understand how perception, memory, 
cognition and knowledge emerged in nature, prior to the evolutionary emergence of 
human beings.  Theory from a number of fields is relevant here, particularly 
biosemiotic theory, whose central contribution is the insight that the evolutionary 
basis of all cognition is the emergence in nature of semiosis – the interpretation and 
making of signs – which occurred in the latter part of the history of the cosmos, but 
long before the evolution of human beings.  My purpose in this paper is to argue that 
the key to understanding how biosemiotic processes function is to recognize that they 
distinctively embody a peculiarly effective form of non-linear causation within the 
hierarchically structured living systems in which they occur.  This is the physical-
systemic “signature” of biosemiosis.  It is this distinctive mode of causation which 
underlies and makes possible all epistemological processes and achievements, and 
indeed life itself. 
It is none of my intention to redefine or radically reconstitute epistemology (as for 
example occurs in Maturana and Varela’s theory of biological autopoiesis,1 or in 
Plotkin’s universal Darwinism,2 or Millikan’s reduction of linguistic meaning to 
naturally selected ‘evolved proper functions’ of linguistic terms).3  Rather, I seek to 
show how current epistemological concepts may be illuminated by an integrating 
framework that draws together insights of evolutionary, biosemiotic, complexity-
theoretic, and umwelt-theoretic approaches.  The integrating principle of this 
framework is an understanding of the mode of non-linear causation distinctive of 
biosemiosis, and of how it makes possible a world of emergent, co-evolving, 
1 H. Maturana & F. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: the Realization of the Living, R.S. Cohen and M.W. 
Wartofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 42. Dordecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co, 1980; 
and H. Maturana & F. Varela, The tree of knowledge: The biological roots of human understanding. Boston: 
Shambhala Publications, 1987. 
2 H. Plotkin, Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993. 
3 R.G. Millikan, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984.  
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communicating, dynamically self-stabilizing, hierarchically structured living systems.  
It is the emergence in nature of this distinctive mode of causation that makes 
cognition possible. 
(b) Inadequacies of the tradition 
Let us first briefly consider how the Western philosophical tradition has approached 
the question, ‘How is knowledge possible?’   
Plato, arguing that our knowledge is made possible by our prior acquaintance 
with a transcendent realm of Forms, told a fairytale of our souls’ former dwelling 
among those transcendent objects of adoration.4  Aristotle’s hylomorphism brought 
forms back to earth,5 while his psychology attributed to them the ability, when our 
senses chance upon them, to in-form our perceptions and thoughts – through a 
mysterious inward duplication of those same forms6 – not a fairytale, but no less a 
mystery.  Like Aristotle, most of the subsequent representationalist tradition failed to 
see there was any problem with its assumption that perception, thought and 
knowledge could be a “mirror of nature” (as Rorty puts it in his critique of the 
tradition).7  Knowledge is possible, the representationalist tradition naively assumes, 
because thought and nature were made for each other, one to be image of the other.   
Such complacency invited scepticism.  It took the jolt of Hume’s scepticism to 
wake Kant ‘from his dogmatic slumbers’.8  In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant proposed 
that only if the mind itself were author of the forms of empirical possibility could 
thought and empirical world correspond.9   Nonetheless, Kant’s transcendental 
account of knowledge’s possibility still presupposes that knowers are beings such as us, 
consciously aware, with highly developed capacities for conceptualisation and 
understanding, reason, imagination, and intricately detailed perception, all integrated 
by unity of apperception and transcendental ego. As to how these are made possible, 
Kant argues only that since we are knowers our nature must be so.   
Aside from Kant and the idealist tradition he influenced (particularly Schelling 
and German Naturphilosophie) the epistemological and scientific mainstreams were 
scarcely stirred in their philosophical slumbers by such questions as ‘How is knowledge 
possible?’  As positivism gained sway in the sciences and logical positivism subverted 
philosophical naturalism, radical philosophical questions were deemed ‘meaningless’, 
4 Esp. Republic, Books 6&7. 
5 Aristotle, Metaphysics. 
6 Aristotle, De Anima. 
7 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979. 
8 As Kant tells us in his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics of 1783. 
9 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 
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‘metaphysical’, or ‘undecidable’, and were treated as practically and theoretically 
worthless.  But not by pragmatism, which kept alive and developed the program of 
philosophical naturalism.   
For pragmatists, our question ‘How is knowledge possible?’ was answerable in 
terms of the greater usefulness and survival value of some practices, habits, and 
underlying neural formations.  Capacity for knowledge was generally attributed to 
evolutionary developments in nature.  Nonetheless, the oddness of knowledge – in a 
universe mostly comprised of unknowing things – was remarked only by a perceptive 
few.   
One thing which, to a naturalistic epistemology, ought to seem most odd about 
knowledge, is its consequentiality – not merely that it should matter at all in a world of 
physical pushes and pulls, of four forces to which all attraction, repulsion, motion, 
combination and dissociation seem attributable – but that in its own modest domain 
knowledge should matter so much!  Whence derives knowledge’s power, its characteristic 
causal non-linearity?  (Non-linearity is disproportionality of “output” to “input”.)  How 
can the comparatively minute neural energies associated with learning (and forgetting) 
be of such consequence – changing lives, changing history, even changing the planet?    
To understand how knowledge is possible we must take seriously its oddness: only 
a study of its peculiarity – indeed, of the peculiarity of the entire gamut of 
epistemological categories – will suffice.  Accordingly, my argument will draw upon 
approaches in philosophy and in the sciences which have acknowledged this 
peculiarity and made it their focus.   
But to take seriously the imperatives of a naturalistic epistemology it must be 
recognized that humans are not the only knowers, perceivers, cognizers and 
rememberers in nature: there are myriad creatures whose survival depends on 
perceptual ability, memory, recognition of dangers and opportunities, and intelligent 
response to situations encountered.  A naturalised epistemology must consider 
cognition biologically.  Moreover, there are gradations of cognitive ability among 
species in nature, gradations which the biologist explains at least partly in 
evolutionary terms.  To explain higher cognitive abilities in nature, it is necessary to 
understand their development from lower abilities.  Thus a naturalistic approach to 
epistemology will inquire not only into the emergence of knowledge, but must ask, 
‘What is it in nature that makes cognition possible?’  Accordingly, my inquiry will be as 
much a philosophical study of nature as it is an epistemological investigation, and my 
central question will be: ‘What is it in nature that makes cognition, and thereby 
knowledge, possible?’   
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2.  MAKING A START: BIOLOGY, PHENOMENOLOGY AND SEMIOTICS   
Fortunately, not all of epistemology was laid waste by positivism.   Development of 
understanding, or growth of capacity for knowledge, could be studied empirically – as 
it was by Piaget and his school.10  A naturalised epistemology incorporates study of 
knowledge’s growth, and may investigate its evolutionary prehistory.  We are 
biological beings immersed in and dependent on a world of multitudes of other 
biological beings, every one of which similarly is situated among and dependent on 
multitudes of others, and multitudes of kinds of others.  Knowing fits us for life in this 
world.  Is this so for humans alone?  Biologists certainly have not thought so.  
Knowledge is a term that figures in the biological sciences, as do other terms from the 
epistemologist’s stock: perception, learning, memory, interpretation, recognition, significance, 
experience, and so forth.  But here the question, ‘How are cognition and knowledge 
possible?’ becomes both more pressing and more tractable: more pressing because 
cognition and knowing are important to the survival of organisms that can cognise and 
know, and so need to be understood if we are to understand their survival; more 
tractable because the implicated processes of perception, learning, memory, 
cognition, interpretation, significance, experience, etc., can be studied in a range of 
beings, from “lower” to “higher”, and their development be thus better understood, 
and thereby the emergence of knowledge also.   
Here, phenomenological study of the structure and character of experience is 
important: study of how it is to be a being that perceives, interprets, feels, remembers, 
thinks, knows and acts, in a world of other beings, including beings like oneself, a 
perceived-world of significance – a ‘life-world’ or Umwelt.11  Accordingly, since 
experience, phenomenologically considered, is of things as significant – as signs of 
something – to understand how nature makes cognition and knowledge possible will 
require that our study consider the semiotics of cognition.12  But the argument need not 
rest on this philosophical consideration alone, for biologists, in their practice and their 
theorizing, continually attribute to organisms powers of interpretation, cognizance of 
information, acts of signalling, recognition of signals and response to their meanings, 
10 J. Piaget, The Construction of Reality in the Child. New York: Basic Books, 1954; and The Principles of Genetic 
Epistemology. New York: Basic Books, 1972.  
11 E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy—Second Book: Studies in 
the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989; A. Schutz, 
The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967; J. von Uexküll, 
‘An introduction to Umwelt’, Semiotica, no. 134, 2001, pp. 107-110. 
12 J. von Uexküll, ‘The theory of meaning’, Semiotica, no. 42, 1982, pp. 25-82. 
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and so forth.13  A principled account of the origins of semiotics in nature will make 
good on this commitment of biologists.   
But how, it might be asked, can interpretation, significance, experience, and the 
like, be studied in non-humans – how can we understand the inner lives of beings very 
different from ourselves?  Here I think it is important to “nip in the bud” a possible 
misunderstanding.  We will not need to discover, for example, what it is like phenomenally 
to experience as a bat experiences – in the sense of Thomas Nagel’s well-known 
philosophical discussion ‘What is it like to be a bat?’14  Rather, it will be sufficient to 
conjecturally posit merely structural features or functional relationships in bat perception 
and cognition (as Nagel recognizes we may).  To take another example, it is known 
that the feature detectors of a frog’s vision are responsive to dots moving across the 
frog’s visual field, but not to stationary dots.15  Thus it is hypothesised that moving 
dots (possibly insects) will be salient in a structural/functional understanding of frog 
perception, while stationary dots (even if they are insects) will be unnoticed and have 
no role in a conjectured phenomenology of frog vision – that is, in the perceived-
world or umwelt of the frog.  Thus, although non-human animal experience may be 
very different from human experience, this will not make it impossible to study.   
Indeed, human experience very different from our own is already studied 
phenomenologically.  Neurologists, for example, may endeavour to construct clinical 
phenomenological understandings of their patients’ neurological pathologies.  Some 
fascinating cases are described by Oliver Sacks.16  Of course, the neurologist may 
converse with the patient, whereas the biologist cannot converse with the organism, 
but a biologist’s reconstruction of the simpler phenomenology of an organism’s 
13 K. Kull, C. Emmeche, & J. Hoffmeyer, ‘Why Biosemiotics?  An Introduction to Our View on the 
Biology of Life Itself’, in C. Emmeche, and K. Kull (eds), Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs, 
London: Imperial College Press, 2011, pp. 1-21; K. Kull, T. Deacon, C. Emmeche, J. Hoffmeyer, & F. 
Stjernfelt, ‘Theses on Biosemiotics: Prolegemona to a Theoretical Biology’, in C. Emmeche and K. Kull 
(eds), Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs, London: Imperial College Press, 2011, pp. 25-41; J. 
Hoffmeyer, ‘Biology is Immature Biosemiotics’, in C. Emmeche and K. Kull (eds), Towards A Semiotic 
Biology, London: Imperial College Press, 2011, pp. 43-65; and Y. Neuman, ‘Why Do We Need Signs in 
Biology?’ In C. Emmeche, and K. Kull (eds), Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs.  London: 
Imperial College Press, 2011, pp. 195-209. 
14 T. Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ Philosophical Review, vol. 83, no. 4, 1974, pp. 435-50.  
15 J.Y. Lettvin, H.R. Maturana, W.S. McCulloch, & W.H. Pitts, ‘What the frog’s eye tells the frog’s 
brain’, in W.C. Corning, & M. Balaban (eds), The Mind: Biological Approaches to its Functions. New York : 
Interscience Publishers, 1968, pp. 233-58.  
16 O. Sacks, Awakenings. London: Duckworth; New York: Doubleday, 1973; The Man Who Mistook His Wife 
for a Hat. London: Duckworth; New York: Summit Books, 1985; An Anthropologist on Mars. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf; London: Picador, 1995; The Island of the Colorblind.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 
London: Picador, 1996. 
                                                          
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 7 
umwelt17 may present no greater difficulty than does the task of the neurologist in 
understanding the patient’s (more complex) experiential pathology.  
3.  JACOB VON UEXKÜLL: THE UMWELT OF AN ORGANISM IS A WORLD OF 
SIGNS  
To understand an organism and its behaviour we need to understand its “world”: that 
is, what things and relationships are salient for it, and why.  Insects see in the 
ultraviolet; we do not.  Sharks and platypuses can sense electric fields; some cetaceans 
have a sense using sonar capable of perceiving even internal organs of other creatures.  
The perceived-world or umwelt of an organism will be comprised only of what can be 
salient for it, given its sensory abilities and sensory/cognitive limitations.  This insight 
of the biologist Jacob von Uexküll (first published in 1909) has led to an appreciation 
of an organism’s umwelt as comprising whatever has meaning or significance for it: 
that is, as a world of signs which mediate the organism’s interaction with the world at 
large.18     
In a later section I will show how this conception of salience is an advance on 
crude stimulus-models of what is salient for the organism’s behaviour.  Here though I 
particularly want to note how umwelt theory has been extended by later theorists19  – 
particularly in ways facilitating an understanding of the theorist and theory as located 
within the “subject-matter” of inquiry.  This is a matter of methodological, 
epistemological, and ontological importance.  Fraser sees it as follows: 
The extension of Uexküll’s Umwelt principle to worlds we know only through 
experiments and/or instruments and/or mathematical models is the extended or 
generalized Umwelt principle.  Of course, the Umwelten of molecules, galaxies, birds 
and bees, baboons and babies, as revealed to us, become part and parcel of our 
own, noetic Umwelt or reality.  The relation between the Umwelten is a hierarchically 
nested one.  Our noetic reality includes those of photons and ticks; the Umwelten of 
photons and ticks do not include the Umwelten of horses or paleolithic artists.20   
17 See J. von Uexküll, Theoretical Biology. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1926; J. von Uexküll, ‘A Stroll 
Through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds’, in Instinctive Behavior: The 
Development of a Modern Concept, ed. and trans. Claire H. Schiller. New York: International Universities 
Press, Inc., 1957, pp. 5-80; J. von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, with a Theory of 
Meaning, trans. Joseph D. O’Neil, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.  
18 Ibid.  Also J. von Uexküll, ‘An introduction to Umwelt’, Semiotica, no. 134, 2001, pp. 107-110.  
19 E.g. J.T. Fraser, ‘The Extended Umwelt Principle: Uexküll and the Nature of Time’, Semiotica, no. 134, 
2001, pp. 263-273.  For a history of the concept, see U. Sutrop, ‘Umwelt, Word and Concept: Two 
Hundred Years of Semantic Change’, Semiotica, no. 134, 2001, pp. 447-462. 
20 Fraser, op. cit., p. 265. 
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Those specialised, theoretical umwelten are never “views from nowhere” as 
traditional and positivist conceptions of scientific and epistemological objectivity 
supposed theory ought to be.  Rather, they are embedded worlds of significance 
under development for and by us.  (And while it may seem odd to apply – but now 
only metaphorically – the concept of umwelten even in the case of molecules and 
photons – which of course are not really observers, and do not really have life-worlds 
or perceived-worlds – it will seem much less odd when we recall the importance of 
thought-experiments of twentieth-century physics which took precisely this approach, 
albeit without using the term umwelt.)  Theoretical umwelten are made possible by the 
umwelten in which they are embedded and which they elaborate and explain.  Reality, 
then, is always reality-for-us – our ‘noetic reality’ as Fraser calls it – but the principled 
inclusiveness and transformative development of our umwelten make them far from 
merely subjective realms of limitation, for we and they are transformed by our 
discovery and investigation of them.   
But how are umwelten – of whatever sort, and whether ours, or those of other 
species – made possible?  How did nature conjure the first umwelten out of mere matter 
and energy, and provide for their subsequent development as species evolved?  The 
key to answering these questions is the distinctive causal character of biosemiosis. 
4.  BIOSEMIOSIS: THE SEMIOTIC, HIERARCHICAL NATURE OF LIFE AND ITS 
EVOLUTION  
An organism is a partial (or “biased”) interpreter of itself, its condition, and its 
environment.  This partiality is reflected in its umwelt, since the organism’s biological 
needs make only some features of its environment salient or significant for it.  To 
adequately theorize the organism’s relationship to “the world at large” (understood in 
terms of our ‘extended umwelt’) we need to recognize that this relationship is essentially 
mediated by the organism’s partiality as an interpreter of the signs afforded by its 
umwelt, that is, by the significance of what is salient for it.  This is the rationale 
motivating research in the field of biosemiotics. 
Biosemiotics is an emerging approach to biology which sees meaning and 
interpretation as crucial for living systems, and semiotic processes as both essential to 
life, and the key to biological evolution.  Its scientific theorists – natural philosophers 
in the fullest sense – aim to develop, in the service of biology, a naturalistic, but non-
anthropocentric, epistemology and ontology of signifying and interpretation.  Using 
this naturalised semiotics they reinterpret and extend established findings from the 
sciences of the modern evolutionary synthesis, and even some of the physical sciences.  
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The broader theoretical motivation for biosemiotics is commitment to a natural 
philosophy of hierarchical emergence.   
An especially clear sketch and application of the biosemiotic approach is Alexei 
Sharov’s ‘The Origin and Evolution of Signs’.21  Here Sharov argues that the origin 
and evolution of signs are one and the same with the origin and evolution of life: ‘that 
life is communication, and that the contents of communication is how to live, i.e. how 
to communicate’, life’s evolution being ‘characterized by increasing complexity of 
communication’.  Since signs require interpreters, and vice versa, they must have 
originated and evolved together.  Sharov argues that they originated with the 
emergence of autocatalytic systems.  (A catalyst is a substance that accelerates a 
chemical reaction without undergoing any permanent change itself; in autocatalysis 
the catalyst is one of the products of the reaction, this constituting a feedback loop in 
the chemical process.)  An autocatalytic system, in Sharov’s sense, is contained within 
some sort of perimeter, but is thermodynamically open (receiving energy and 
chemical “feedstock” from outside), and is catalytically self-sufficient.  In this way, an 
autocatalytic system is self-maintaining even though it remains in dynamic 
disequilibrium.  Sharov hypothesises that life originated with systems of polymer 
autocatalysis.   
Such systems, he thinks, may be deemed semiotic firstly because they would be 
responsive: certain signals (primitive signs) would prompt certain actions or responses 
(primitive interpretations) in the system (for example, selective incorporation of 
monomers – polymers are comprised of chained monomers).  Secondly, inasmuch as 
such systems are dynamically self-responsive, they are self-interpreting, thereby 
exhibiting what the physicist Pattee terms ‘semantic closure’.22  And thirdly, not only 
are autocatalytic systems self-maintaining, they may be self-reproducing: budding-off 
polymeric replicas of themselves which thereby already incorporate the information 
needed to be likewise dynamically self-maintaining and self-reproducing.23  This last is 
an instance of what Hoffmeyer terms vertical semiosis.24  Of course, unlike the 
21 A. Sharov, ‘The Origin and Evolution of Signs’, Semiotica, no. 127, 1999, pp. 521-535. 
22 H.H. Pattee, ‘Evolving Self-Reference: Matter, Symbols, and Semantic Closure’, Communication and 
Cognition, vol. 12, 1995, pp. 9-27.  
23 For a conjectural discussion, see e.g. S.A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-Organisation and Selection in 
Evolution, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
24 J. Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996; and 
Biosemiotics. An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of Signs, Scranton PA: University of Scranton 
Press, 2008.  
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paradigmatic form of vertical semiosis accomplished by means of coded DNA,25 this 
primitive form involves no code.  
Sharov holds that those reasons for describing such autocatalytic systems as 
semiotic, are equally reasons for deeming them to be alive, and that their emergence 
in nature is thus the emergence of life.  Less controversial is his view that vertical 
semiosis is at the root of life’s evolution,26 although his assumption that all subsequent 
evolution likewise occurs through autocatalysis may be controversial.  My own view is 
that whether one describes systems of polymer autocatalysis as alive, or (alternatively) 
as proto-life or pre-life, what is most important is that they are capable of selectively 
discriminating aspects of their environment and of selectively responding.  This is 
semiosis.  I would prefer to describe these systems as proto-semiotic precursors of living 
systems, rather than as already biosemiotic, because they lack the hierarchical-
functional complexity of living systems, and do not require the delicate forms of 
hierarchical feedback and modulation that only biological semiosis affords (see the 
section, ‘Pushes, prods, and prompts’, below). 
The meaning of an environmental sign for a primitive semiotic system will be an 
action or response, not a representation somehow “held” within the system.  No such 
representation is possible or necessary in these systems.  With regard to viability, 
reproduction, and evolution, some of the actions available to systems as possible 
interpretations of a given sign may make a greater contribution than others.  Which 
interpretation a system makes may thus have significance for its survival and 
reproduction, and ultimately for the evolution of a lineage.27   
Next to emerge in the evolution of semiotic strategies of life is cooperation.  
Sharov argues that this occurs through the incorporation of numbers of autocatalytic 
systems into metasystems, in which each member affords products (signs) for others 
and is the recipient (interpreter) of others’ products (signs).28  Within these internally 
differentiated metasystems, cooperative strategies symbiotically co-evolved in which 
communication between metasystem components integrated development of 
‘hypercycles’ of ‘metasystem transitions’.  (Metasystem transitions can occur at various 
hierarchical levels of scale.  Hypercycles involve embedded and/or serial causal 
complexity.)  The advantages of such strategies may include hierarchical buffering of 
components, availability of compensatory systems in cases of component failure, more 
effective information gathering, increased specialisation, and increased hierarchical 
25 M. Barbieri, The Organic Codes. An Introduction to Semantic Biology, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003; and ‘Life is Semiosis’, Cosmos and History, vol. 4, no.1-2, 2008, pp. 29-52.  
26 See also Hoffmeyer, 1996 and 2008; and Barbieri, ibid.  
27 Sharov, 1999.   
28 Ibid.  
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control.  What Sharov stresses here is that cooperation is essentially communication, 
and involves a new level of semiosis: ‘horizontal semiosis’.29  From such semiotic 
strategies evolved the cell, the organism, communities of organisms, and so forth.   
Here we may pause in this conjectural evolutionary history of biosemiosis to note 
an important disagreement between two schools of biosemiotic thought.  The 
evolution of sub-system cooperation within biological metasystems would appear be a 
necessary condition for the emergence of semiotic codes such as the genetic code.  
However, contrary to the approach of Sharov, Kull, Seboek, Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 
and indeed the majority of biosemiotic theorists, an alternative theoretical approach 
holds that biosemiosis essentially occurs through the operation of codes, and thus must 
have emerged contemporaneously with the emergence of natural codes.30  I think this 
view is mistaken for two reasons.  The first is its seeming refusal to acknowledge that a 
biological system’s recognition of non-coded signals as signals (that is, as signs) is 
genuinely semiotic (since it is an interpretation of the signal’s meaning for the system).  
This refusal seems arbitrary.  The second is its seeming failure to recognize what is 
physically unique to and distinctive of semiosis – its causal signature – which is a quite 
distinctive form of non-linear causation.  I elaborate on this in section 5 below.   
Returning now to Sharov’s conjectural evolutionary history of semiosis, we note 
that all semiosis to this stage involves signals – primitive signs – signs ‘immediately 
interpreted as actions’.31  These are in effect evaluated (by a living system, 
metasystem, co-operative community, or lineage) according to the reproductive value 
of their respective interpretations – this is their ‘significance’ for the system, ‘their 
usefulness’, as Sharov calls it.  Values, that is, values for a system, emerge with function 
– that is, in relation to the functional importance of a particular sign-type for the 
survival or reproduction of the system.   
The foregoing stages of semiotic evolution will have resulted in the emergence of 
single-celled organisms, and, through evolution of cellular cooperation and 
hierarchical functional self-organization, nucleated single-celled organisms, 
multicellular protists (slime moulds), plants, and animals.  However, the next phase of 
semiotic evolution introduces a new form of interpretation and evaluation: the 
conceptual interpretation of proper signs, which makes possible evaluation as to truth 
or falsity.  Sharov explicates the semiosis of proper signs in terms of Peirce’s triad of 
29 See also Hoffmeyer, 1996 and 2008.   
30 See for example Barbieri, 2003 and 2008.  For critical discussion see K. Kull, C. Emmeche, & J. 
Hoffmeyer, ‘Why Biosemiotics?  An Introduction to Our View on the Biology of Life Itself’, in C. 
Emmeche and K. Kull (eds), Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs, London: Imperial College 
Press, 2011, pp. 1-21.  
31 Sharov, 1999.   
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object, sign, and interpretant, linking this with the account of earlier phases of 
semiosis via a simplified version of Peirce’s philosophical pragmatism.32  Reproductive 
value is deemed a prime form of pragmatic value, while truth is that which the 
interpreter is prepared to trust as the best conceptual means for modelling goal-
oriented action (this being itself indirectly related to self-maintenant and reproductive 
value).  The main differences between proper signs and signals are that the former 
permit semiotic evaluation via conceptual modelling, rather than requiring that 
interpretation be directly open to testing in action, and secondly that a proper sign 
may have multifarious uses and hence interpretations.   (See section 7 below for 
discussion of epistemological implications of these distinctions.) 
5.  PUSHES, PRODS AND PROMPTS: THE ESSENTIAL CAUSAL NON-LINEARITY 
OF BIOSEMIOTIC MODULATION OF MULTIPLE LEVELS OF ORGANIC 
FUNCTIONING 
(a)  Modelling causal processes: three phases of modern science 
There have been three broad phases of modern physical science.  As Warren Weaver 
put it, ‘physical science before 1900 was largely concerned with two-variable problems 
of simplicity’;33 then, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, various sciences 
developed ways of statistically modelling and understanding what Weaver terms 
‘disorganized complexity’: systems whose dynamics involved ‘perhaps billions’ of 
variables.34  For a considerable time, these stochastic methods were the only means of 
representing complexity.  (In some fields today complexity is treated as if they were 
still the only means.)  However, in its most recent phase (beginning around the time 
Weaver wrote) science has turned its attention to ‘problems ... of organized 
complexity’; these ‘involve dealing simultaneously with a sizable number of factors 
which are interrelated into an organic whole’.35   
32 Ibid.; also A. Sharov, ‘Umwelt theory and pragmatism’, Semiotica, no. 134, 2001, pp. 211-228.   Sharov 
draws selectively on Peirce; cf. C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, (8 vols), C. Hartshorne, 
P. Weiss and A.W. Burks (eds), Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1931-1958, or (more conveniently) C.S. 
Peirce, The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1 (1867–1893). Nathan Houser and Christian 
J. W. Kloesel (eds), Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992, and The Essential 
Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893–1913), Peirce Edition Project (eds), Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998.  
33 W. Weaver, ‘Science and Complexity’, American Scientist, vol. 36, 1948, pp. 536-544.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  For general introductions to complexity theory, see R. Lewin, Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos, 
2nd edition, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999, and A. Gare, ‘Systems Theory 
and Complexity: Introduction’, Democracy and Nature, vol. 6, no. 3, 2000, pp. 327-339. 
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The first phase of modern science (its Newtonian, mechanistic-reductionist phase) 
assumed that causation was simple, linear, deterministic, mechanical and 
unidirectional – a conception that survives today in popular belief.  While this causal 
model was inappropriate for the second (probabilistic) phase of modern science, it was 
quite some time before indeterminist probabilistic analyses of causation were 
developed.  However, both the former and the latter afford little understanding of the 
types of complex processes of interest in the third and most recent phase of modern 
science.  Indeed, it is only comparatively recently that causal theory has begun to 
respond to this third phase by incorporating scientific insights regarding the generic 
characteristics of various types of complex dynamics.36  For it has been one of the 
most striking discoveries of complexity science that similar complex dynamics and 
patterns of self-organizing emergent order may be found in very different processes, at 
widely different levels of spatiotemporal scale, and involving quite different sub-
processes, entities, materials and forms of energy.  A new scientific vocabulary has 
appeared, including such terms as ‘the edge of chaos’ (designating a dynamic regime 
of organised complexity identified by its generic characteristics)37 and ‘excitable 
media’ (designating physical systems comprised of multiple, similar, interacting units – 
such as living cells – among which signal propagation and feedback can induce 
spontaneous emergence of generic forms of rhythmically propagating macroscopic 
self-organisation).38  It is upon this emerging array of generic dynamic models that I will 
draw to show why and how biosemiosis is crucial for living beings and living 
processes.   
(b)  Hierarchy theory  
Hierarchy theory provides an understanding of contexts of emergence, and of how 
emergents themselves can be self-organizing contexts for emergence.  It allows also a 
clearer understanding of the coherence, robustness and resilience of emergents.  And 
36 E.g. Kauffman, op. cit.; J. Cohen & I. Stewart, The Collapse of Chaos: Discovering Simplicity in a Complex 
World, London & New York: Penguin, 1995; B. Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of 
Complexity, London: Phoenix, 1995; S.N. Salthe, Evolving Hierarchical Systems: Their Structure and Representation, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, and S. N. Salthe, Development and Evolution: Complexity and 
Change in Biology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993; C. Emmeche, S. Koppe & F. Stjernfelt, ‘Levels, 
Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation’, in P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. 
Finnemann, & P.V. Christiansen (eds), Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter, Aarhus: Aarhus 
University Press, 2000, pp. 13-34; R. Solé & B. Goodwin, Signs of Life: How Complexity Pervades Biology, New 
York: Basic Books, 2000; T.W. Deacon, Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter, New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2012.  
37 See e.g. Solé & Goodwin, op. cit. 
38 See e.g. ibid., pp. 21-25. 
                                                          
 MICHAEL DIX 14 
it is indispensable for an understanding of processes of biosemiosis and their 
importance.   
In natural ‘scalar’ hierarchies – that is, “nested” hierarchies, in which higher 
levels of scale subsume lower levels; for example, an organism subsumes/contains its 
organs, which subsume/contain their cells, which subsume/contain their organelles, 
which subsume/contain complex molecules, etc.39 – different levels typically operate 
at different rates of activity.  The dynamics of higher-level processes – their rates of 
contextual and lower-level sampling, and intra-level activity – typically are slower 
than those of the lower-level processes which subserve them.40  This enables 
hierarchically constituted living systems to be robust in the face of perturbation 
(whether from life’s “slings and arrows”, or life’s opportunities).  As mentioned earlier, 
living systems are not in equilibrium; they function far-from-equilibrium, at the ‘edge 
of chaos’, which is the realm of organized complexity and emergence.  In systems far 
from equilibrium, small variations may be vastly amplified – as in the so-called 
“butterfly effect”.  This is particularly so in a hierarchical system when propagation of 
a small perturbation of one sub-system entrains the activity of further sub-systems 
resulting in a non-linear cascade which ultimately may place at risk – or alternatively 
preserve – the viability of the whole hierarchical system.  For example, the minute 
energies of a few barely audible words, their faint vibrations entering the ear and 
transduced by the inner ear into minute neural signals, these entraining auditory-
cognitive sub-systems of the brain and further systems of memory, affect, cognition 
and motivation, in a neural cascade which now entrains efferent sub-systems and the 
vastly greater energies of bodily activity, might have life-changing (or, for some, even 
life-ending) consequences.   
However, the hierarchical constitution of living systems also operates to reduce 
their vulnerability to life’s “slings and arrows” and to inadvertencies of the “butterfly 
effect”.  For systems of hierarchical damping may largely confine the consequences of 
perturbation to a single systemic level.  This occurs in two ways.  First, the larger scale 
and slower rates of functioning of higher levels in a scalar hierarchy mean that 
disturbance in the level below will be “sampled” relatively infrequently by the higher 
level, and thus may be partly or even wholly “invisible” to it – in other words, 
sampling infrequency is a form of natural non-linear damping of transmission of 
disturbance from lower to higher.  (The higher level of course may still be vulnerable 
to disturbances from the lower of types it is unable to sample.)  Whereas, secondly, at 
39 See Salthe, 1985 and 1993, for the distinction between ‘scalar’ hierarchies and ‘specification’ 
hierarchies. 
40 See e.g. R.V. O’Neill, D.L. DeAngelis, J.B. Waide & T.H.F. Allen, A Hierarchical Concept of Ecosystems, 
Monographs in Population Biology, no. 23, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986. 
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the level below the disturbance, many activity cycles will have been completed while 
the disturbance develops more slowly above, the faster rate of functioning of the lower 
level allowing it sufficient time for adaptive adjustments and/or equilibrative 
dispersion of shock, and thus to resiliently absorb the transmitted disturbance without 
harm.41   
Recognition that in a resilient (that is, a viable) scalar hierarchy, disturbance in one 
level typically will be damped at the levels immediately above and below, motivates 
Salthe’s methodological triad of a ‘focal’ level, a ‘constraining’ level immediately 
above, and a subserving level immediately below the focal level.42  To understand 
hierarchical functioning at a given level of living process, it normally will not be 
necessary to consider all functional levels of the system, because the perturbatory 
influence on the focal level of levels above or below that triad normally will be within 
the capabilities of the system to accommodate.   
(c)  Causal emergence and natural hierarchies 
There are deep theoretical issues and debates concerning causation in natural 
hierarchies.43  I will broach these only insofar as is absolutely necessary.   
My commitment to philosophical naturalism leads me to accept an ontology in 
which  
Everything is organizations of quantum processes... [and] causality is constraints 
on that quantum field activity, such as those that yield momentum or energy 
conservation.44  
However, this is not a reductive ontology, for organization – patterning of causal 
constraint – is emergent and ontologically real.  In sketching the history of cosmic 
emergence, Bickhard and Campbell draw on contemporary theory in evolutionary 
cosmology: 
The universe at its origin was a superhot flux of quantum fields; everything since 
then is the result of condensation, symmetry breaking, and organization out of 
that original flux, sometimes with clear hierarchical levels of organization.  Quark 
excitations stabilize in combinations with other such excitations into nucleons, 
41 See O’Neill et al., op. cit.; Salthe, 1985 and 1993; and Deacon, op. cit.  
42 Salthe, ibid.  
43 For discussion from a variety of perspectives, see P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, & 
P.V. Christiansen (eds), Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 
2000; see T.W. Deacon, op. cit., for critique of some of these perspectives. 
44 M.H. Bickhard & D.T. Campbell, ‘Emergence’, in P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, & 
P.V. Christiansen (eds), Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 
2000, p. 327.   
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which combine with electrons to form atoms, which combine chemically to form 
molecules, which combine gravitationally to form planets or in derivative 
chemical ways to form rocks, water, cats, humans, and, presumably, minds....  
Note that successively higher levels often require successively lower temperatures 
to emerge.45   
I will pause here to briefly explain and illustrate the concept of physical 
emergence, drawing on the example of chemical emergence.  Early in the history of 
the universe there were no chemicals and no chemical reactions: because the pre-
chemical universe was too energetic to permit the formation of atoms with their 
distinctive electron-shells – these being essential for chemical activity.  That is, 
chemical processes emerged only when energy levels in relevant portions of the universe 
had sufficiently cooled.  Chemical causal process is therefore different from, say, the 
processes of nuclear fusion and fission which produce the chemical elements and 
disperse them into cooler regions of the universe, and which are thus prerequisite for 
the emergence of chemical processes.  Hence we may say that chemical causation is 
an example of emergent causation – or as Bickhard and Campbell term it, ‘emergent 
causality’, as when they stress that ‘Emergence which is non-trivial is emergent 
causality’.46  
Bickhard and Campbell argue that emergent causality will ‘necessarily involve 
downward causality’.47  What they mean here is that hierarchically nested systems are 
prerequisites for causal emergence: downward causation being constraint on the 
activity of sub-systems by the activity of the superordinate system of which they are 
sub-systems.  Here the distinction between linear and non-linear processes becomes 
crucial.  Linear causation can be accounted for without postulating a new ontological 
level; thus non-linearity is a criterion for hierarchical emergence which is ‘non-
trivial’,48 and hence for emergent causation.  At each level of emergence, new modes 
of non-linear causal process appear.  
To go beyond this brief sketch of emergent causation would require a theoretical 
paper in itself, so I will proceed directly to a consideration now of how the natural 
emergence of biosemiosis constitutes an emergently novel mode of causation in its 
character as physical process. 
 
45 Ibid., p. 325.  
46 Ibid., p. 334. 
47 Ibid., p. 333.  
48 Ibid., p. 334.  
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(d)  Comparing pushes, prods, and prompts: how to recognize biosemiotic causation 
I have several times stressed that biosemiosis requires only tiny exchanges of energy 
between sign and interpreting system.  Now I want to explain why this is so by 
contrasting the energy exchanges involved respectively in what I shall term pushes 
(together with pulls and pressures), prods and prompts, to show why it is that 
biosemiosis is primarily and paradigmatically through the type of physical causal 
process characteristic of prompts, rather than the grosser types characteristic of 
pushes or prods.   
Pushes: Consider the ways in which the functioning of a system may be physically 
modulated.  Simple mechanical systems function linearly by means of pushes, pulls 
and pressures.  A bicycle is such a system.  Another is a simple feedback system such 
as a mechanically governed steam engine; this too is modulated by pushes, pulls and 
pressures.  The energies required for modulation of those simple systems are 
considerable – much greater than those modulating one’s heart-rate for example.  
This is so too with regard to human action involving pushes and pulls.  Suppose, for 
example, someone intentionally gives me a shove – perhaps wishing me to step 
forward as a volunteer.  Only part of their purpose is semiotic; the shove accomplishes 
the remainder of its purpose non-semiotically.  If, physically, biosemiosis were 
typically like this, it would be extraordinarily wasteful of energy.  And it might also be 
counter-productive, because the magnitude of energy transfer might produce 
deleterious consequences.  (A shove, for example, instead of inducing me to step 
forward as a volunteer, might cause me to overbalance and fall on my face.)  Given 
the many thousands of biological modulation and control systems involved in our 
highly complex bodily functioning – at the levels of organism, organs, cells, and sub-
cellular processes – we will need much more energy-efficient modes of sampling, 
feedback and control than could be provided by mere infliction of pushes and pulls.   
Prods: The situation of living things is complicated further by hierarchical biology.  
A prod (a less energetic, more focused type of push) may wake me from sleep or 
reverie, but the transmitted energies of a prod to the eye, for example, might be so 
great as to blind me.  In other words, it is important that non-essential causal aspects 
of the sign-vehicle not physically overwhelm or destabilize the interpreting system or 
its sub-systems (preventing or impeding interpretive-responsive activity).  Nonetheless, 
a prod may convey meaning – a prod may be interpreted as a sign – an instance of 
biosemiosis.  However, it is still a very inefficient sign (even if sometimes effective).  If 
every cell needed so comparatively energetic a signal before it allowed ingress of 
nutriment or egress of waste, our bodies could not function!  The excessive physical 
energy of prod, then, is not typical of biosemiotic causation.  Rather, it is only because 
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living systems are already served by vastly more energy-efficient forms of 
communication that are much less likely to cause damage or destabilization, that 
prods can sometimes be recruited to semiotic effect.   
Prompts: Paradigmatically, semiosis requires initial transfer or conversion of very 
little energy – physically, this is characteristic of a prompt rather than a prod.  Ideally, 
in biosemiosis the physical sign-vehicle (for example, reflected light reaching the 
retina) will be of sufficiently low energy for no damage to be caused to the sensory 
system.  (In contrast, an image transmitted by an array of lasers might blind me.)  A 
second reason why energy transfers involved in semiosis need to be small is so that the 
interpreting system not be destabilized by the energy demands of interpretation 
before the process of interpretation is able to yield an interpretant – Peirce’s term for the 
causally constituted physical action-potential which (we might say) is the pragmatic 
meaning of the sign for the interpreting system.49  Initial transduction of a low-energy 
signal (for example, at the retina) will itself be of low-energy, but will prompt 
entrainment of further discriminatory physical processes (such as activation of the 
brain’s visual feature-detectors, memory of other signs, etc.) and possibly motor 
activity (such as exploratory behaviour).  This process of entrainment is non-linear, 
and is a second definitive physical characteristic of biosemiosis. 
But there is also a third distinctive causal feature of biosemiosis: the nuanced 
cascade of non-linear consequences prompted by the sign is hierarchical.  Earlier I 
resisted Sharov’s description of primitive autocatalytic polymeric systems as 
biosemiotic living systems.  I would prefer to call them semiotic precursors of life 
(assuming that they are the precursors of living things).  This is firstly because there 
may have been only one signal, or very few, that the system was capable of reacting to 
– such that in each case the signal is effectively no more than a switch for “turning on” 
a particular activity.  Secondly, although the autocatalytic system’s response to the 
sign is non-linear, it is possible that the system is too simply structured to have 
involved a hierarchical cascade of internal activity (as biosemiosis paradigmatically 
requires).  In such a case, there is primitive molecular semiosis, but no life.  However, 
I suppose that if a primitive autocatalytic self-maintaining polymeric system were also 
self-reproducing (by budding-off copies of itself) there might be some reason for 
describing it as alive, but even in this case I would prefer to reserve this description for 
the time when the now numerous autocatalytic systems begin responding to signs 
produced by each other – that is, when there emerges the new hierarchical level of a 
community of semiotic systems.   
49 I simplify here; Peirce, 1931-1958, characterizes interpretants in many ways. 
                                                          
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 19 
The causality of biosemiosis is multi-level and “multi-directional”.  From “below”, 
it subserves semiotic levels above by providing them with the potential meanings that 
are their semiotic wherewithal (as, for example, when semantic memory makes 
meaningful speech possible) or by entraining processes that will do so.  Intra-level, 
biosemiosis constrains (that is, mediates, guides, co-ordinates, shapes and enables) 
cooperation and competition.  From “above”, biosemiosis selectively constrains 
activity below (through entrained modulation of boundary conditions for the lower 
level activity).  The “higher” the biosemiotic activity, the less frequent is its operation 
but the more general may be its consequences.  Biosemiotic causation is a causality of 
constraint, not of mechanical necessitation.  Given this, we might wonder at its 
effectiveness.  But the efficacy of biosemiosisis, while marvellous, is no mystery.  Its 
wonders of nuanced, enabling constraint are accomplished through highly nuanced 
entrainment of higher-energy processes.50   
Thus we now have a criterion of the physical character of biosemiosis – its causal 
signature (as I have called it) – a reliable sign of its presence in a system.  Where we 
find, in a system far-from-equilibrium, a physical stimulus prompting an initially tiny 
transduction of energy that subsequently produces a non-linearly increased hierarchical 
cascade of entrained physical sub-system consequences peculiarly or typically 
associated with that stimulus-type, there we have biosemiosis.  I would stress this 
particularly in response to those who, while perhaps acknowledging the usefulness of 
the concept of biosemiosis, would treat it as nothing more than a useful (but, in 
principle, unnecessary) fiction or metaphor.  In contrast to that view, I am arguing 
that the unique causal/physical signature of biosemiosis identifies it ontologically, and 
stamps it undeniably as a natural kind in good standing.  (There are also of course 
semiotic-functional reasons for deeming it a natural kind.  In living nature, all roads 
lead to (and from) semiosis.) 
6.  THE EVOLUTION OF BIOSEMIOSIS AND THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 
Biosemiosis is crucial at every level of living system.  There is organelle biosemiosis, 
cellular biosemiosis, organ biosemiosis, organism biosemiosis, and ecological 
biosemiosis.  At every level there is intra-level community biosemiosis.  And between 
successive levels of living organization there is inter-level biosemiosis.  The complexity 
50 K. Kull, T. Deacon, C. Emmeche, J. Hoffmeyer, & F. Stjernfelt, ‘Theses on Biosemiotics: 
Prolegemona to a Theoretical Biology’, in C. Emmeche & K. Kull (eds), Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is 
the Action of Signs, London: Imperial College Press, 2011, pp. 25-41; K. Kull, C. Emmeche & D. Favareau, 
‘Biosemiotic Research Questions’, in C. Emmeche & K. Kull (eds), Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the 
Action of Signs, London: Imperial College Press, 2011, pp. 67-90.  
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of organisms thus requires not only that there be intra-level and inter-level sensitivity to 
signs, but that there be inter-level and intra-level production of signs.  Given my 
discussion above of the need for energy-efficiency in biosemiosis, and given that 
biological systems (and their sub-systems) produce signs at least partly to benefit 
themselves (that is, to maintain their own viability), it is important that producing the 
sign not too much deplete their resources (since in general the cost of sign-production 
needs to be commensurate with the benefits to be gained). 
As Sharov and other biosemioticians argue, nature’s “invention” of biosemiosis 
makes possible all of life.  This invention had three main stages: first, the emergence 
(through processes of system self-organization) of the distinctive low-initial-energy 
causality of primitive semiosis, second, emergence of hierarchically complex 
interpretive systems; and third, emergence of proper signs and the ability of living 
systems to (conceptually) model potential responses and to evaluate the models rather 
than directly testing an interpretation through action.  Because living systems and 
their living sub-systems necessarily function far-from-equilibrium, they must 
continually sample and assess the signs afforded by their umwelts, and appropriately 
respond to them to modulate their trajectories and maintain their viability as living 
systems in the face of disturbances which inevitably occur in this dynamic edge-of-
chaos regime.  Here, where small perturbations can produce potentially destructive 
non-linear consequences, it is important for living systems to be able not only to 
monitor and respond to potential dangers, but also to anticipate them.  This too is 
among the functions (and the epistemological achievements) of biosemiosis (see 
section 7 below).  
It is now well understood that all biological evolution is co-evolution.  However, 
within every level of living process, and between immediately successive levels of 
living hierarchy – from the sub-cellular all the way through to complex ecologies – 
living systems are essentially inter-signifying.  Nuanced interactions between members 
of communities (whether of organelles, or cells, or conspecific organisms, or multiple 
species in an ecological system) are mediated by and depend upon biosemiosis.  
Indeed, it is biosemiosis that makes possible their co-viability.  Given that cooperative 
and competitive interactions depend upon biosemiosis, and that evolutionary 
developments involve changes in these interactions, it is clear not only that co-
evolution is at least partly biosemiotic in its causes and its consequences, but also that 
biosemiosis and living systems have co-evolved.   
Let us turn now to the evolution of nature’s epistemological achievements: tracing 
(conjecturally, and very generally) the natural sequence of emergence (through 
semiosis) of intentionality, anticipation, sensation and perception, memory and 
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learning, pre-conceptual and conceptual knowledge, complex communication, 
thought, and understanding.  
7.  HOW BIOSEMIOSIS MAKES COGNITION, KNOWING, AND OTHER 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS POSSIBLE  
(a)  Intentionality and umwelt emerge with the emergence of semiosis   
We should start at the beginning.  Epistemologically, what may we say of a self-
maintaining, self-reproducing, autocatalytic, polymeric system of the sort Sharov 
discusses?  It has a minimal repertoire of sensitivity to a very few primitive signs.  It 
would be an exaggeration to deem this sensitivity sensory, and an even greater 
exaggeration to call it perceptual, as the system has no sensory or perceptual sub-
system(s).  Rather, its responsiveness to signs seems to rely on a few specific forms of 
irritability of its enclosing membrane.  Each form of irritability is specific to a particular 
environmental sign that “triggers” a particular chemical response (the interpretant) 
within the system.  However, it is in this very specificity that its intentionality consists.  
Intentionality requires neither perception (properly so-called) nor consciousness nor 
higher-level thought.  Its reality is not mysterious, but is causal/functional: it is the 
“for-the-system-ness” of the causation that is characteristic of semiosis.  The natural 
emergence of intentionality is none other than the emergence of this 
causal/functional “for-the-system-ness”; and with respect to an emergent 
causal/functional semiotic “repertoire” it is the emergence of an umwelt.  Viewed 
causally and functionally, “for-the-system-ness” is prospective and anticipatory.   
(b)  Semiosis is essentially anticipatory   
The “for-the-system-ness” of semiotic causation pertains to the system’s continuance 
and potentiality; it is thus essentially prospective.  And inasmuch as it is prospective, 
semiosis is essentially anticipatory.  (See also 7(c) and 7(d) below.)  Although it might 
seem that conceptual modelling – that is, representation, and/or representational 
memory – would be required for anticipation, I do not think either is necessary (see 
also 8(b)(3) below).  Indeed, I think all semiosis is anticipatory, inasmuch as the 
meaning imputed (whether explicitly or implicitly, conceptually or non-conceptually, 
in reflection or in action) is always, even if only implicitly, in some measure prospective.  
The upshot of all semiosis is, in effect, Now do this, or, at higher levels of cognition, Now 
think this, where the mode of thought may be further glossed and inherently involves 
valuation; and where in each case, that which is to be done or thought is either to 
continue, begin, or complete an activity or project.  Biosemiosis is thus prospective in 
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three biologically fundamental ways: (1) as anticipation of either the beginning, 
continuance or completion of an activity or project; (2) in its potential for contributing 
to system continuance and viability; and (3) in its evolutionary role with respect to a 
system’s reproduction and contribution to a viable lineage.  (1) and (2) pertain to all 
semiotic systems, since the meaning of a sign (for the system) will consist in activity 
subsequent to the sign which prompted it.  In that time gap (however long or short) 
circumstances may or may not have changed; the activity thus needs to be apt for 
those subsequent circumstances, and thus needs to anticipate their trajectory if it is to 
avoid being unproductive or counter-productive.  And with regard to (2) and (3), 
natural selection will have favoured actions which are more likely to be apt for those 
changed circumstances and which in that sense better anticipate their trajectory. 
(c)  Sensitivity, perception, knowledge, memory   
Does a primitive autocatalytic semiotic system have knowledge?  Certainly it has no 
declarative or propositional knowledge; but may we say at least that it knows how to 
respond to a few signs, or that it knows how to maintain and reproduce itself?  I 
would prefer to say it doesn’t know how not to do those things: the sign, as causal 
irritant, simply triggers the particular response.  The system’s specific irritabilities, and 
the resultant response-triggerings, are epistemological achievements of sorts, but just 
as I would resist describing them as sensitivity or perception, I would hesitate also to 
call them cognition or knowing.  Nonetheless, the system’s epistemological 
achievement is considerable; for (as I have argued) its emergent causality constitutes 
primitive chemical semiosis, and thus intentionality, and (as repertoire or habit) the 
formation of an umwelt.   
However, because spontaneously emergent “complexification” – that is, self-
organization – is possible for systems at the edge of chaos,51 self-maintaining, self-
reproducing hierarchical semiotic systems eventually will have emerged.  In time, some 
would develop semiotic sub-systems facilitating more nuanced responses to a larger 
repertoire of signs – autopoietic, living systems (autopoiesis is Maturana and Varela’s 
biological criterion for a living organism: an autopoietic system is not only self-
stabilizing and self-maintaining, but it makes the sub-systems that it needs in order to 
make its sub-systems and to maintain its own viability).52  As biosemiotic 
responsiveness becomes more nuanced, sensitivity replaces mere irritability; and as 
organisms evolve sub-systems enabling semiotic sensitivity, sensation and perception 
emerge in nature.   
51 See e.g. Goodwin, op. cit.; Solé & Goodwin, op. cit.; and Kauffman, op. cit.  
52 Maturana & Varela, 1980 and 1987.   
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But at what level of nature or at what stage of evolution does knowledge begin?  
Does the Venus fly trap know how to catch insects?  Or does it just do it (in a 
semiotically mediated way) without needing to know how?  If, like Maturana and 
Varela, we were to redefine knowing, so as to say with them that ‘living is knowing’,53 
we would attribute knowledge to the Venus fly trap.  Perhaps there is little harm in 
this, but I’m not persuaded it is necessary.  My own view is that the fly trap does not 
need to know how to trap insects, because it cannot prevent itself from trapping them.  
However, if it were able to modulate its response in light of circumstances, I would see 
no problem in saying it knows how to catch insects.  At any event, theoretical 
orientation will determine where we deem knowing to begin in nature.  Likewise, 
whether we hold it to require capacity for memory.  My own view on this is that 
memory (properly, and not merely figuratively, so-called) may be unnecessary for 
knowing-how, since inherited instincts may constitute an ersatz “memory” sufficient 
for at least some of the abilities describable as knowing-how and for the biosemiotic 
responsiveness they rely on.  
However, propositional knowledge, I think, does require appropriate systems of 
memory – in addition to the foregoing capabilities.  But is that enough – or is the 
semiotic sophistication of language also required?   Philosophers once assumed so, 
because they saw no other way of incorporating meaning into cognition.  Since we now 
have the concepts of biosemiosis and umwelt for this purpose, we are no longer 
hamstrung in that way, so let us explore which epistemological achievements are 
possible pre-linguistically and which are not.   
Another name for propositional knowledge is knowing-that (for example, knowing 
that one is hungry).  It is also termed declarative knowledge.  We should not assume 
from this that by definition it requires language.  However, it does seem to call for 
possession of relevant concepts.  In turn, possession of concepts seems to require 
sensory discrimination (that is, interpretation of signs) informed by memory.  Does the 
dog know it is going to be taken for a walk?  It recognises the lead and collar in your 
hand and is excited – we probably suppose that it is anticipating a walk, which 
anticipation we attribute to its memory of similar past occasions when the lead and 
collar signified that an enjoyable walk was imminent.  But does the dog have the 
concepts of a lead, a collar, a walk, or imminence?  Does it need these particular 
concepts in order to know that it is going for a walk?  It recognizes the lead, but 
perhaps not as what we mean by a dog’s lead.  Our concept is no part of the dog’s 
umwelt, and neither is our understanding of ‘going for a walk’.  But while we cannot 
avoid using concepts from our own umwelt in describing the umwelt of the dog, this 
53 Ibid.  
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need not be to impute our concepts or our particular recognitions to the dog.  
Nonetheless, the dog’s behaviour does betoken recognition of signs, despite our 
inability to characterize its recognitions in “dog-concepts”.  Uexküll’s central insight 
was that we can conjecturally posit a systematic functional/structural interpretation of 
the dog’s behaviour and umwelt, in terms of (conjectured) similarities with, and 
differences from our own.  With regard to the dog’s knowledge in this particular 
example, perhaps we should simply say it recognizes or knows (in its own way) what is 
going to happen.  (We might call this form of knowledge knowing-what, or more 
generally knowing-wh...)  And with regard to its semiotic achievement, that it recognizes 
(knows, in its own way) what the signs are signs of.   
However, let us suppose that on this occasion the dog is disappointed – no walk 
ensues.  After several such disappointments, might the dog eventually recognize – 
come to know – that it is not going for a walk?   The appearance of what we refer to as 
‘the dog’s lead’ is a sign for the dog of what we term ‘the imminence’ of what we 
understand as ‘our taking the dog for a walk’.  It is so because the dog has learned the 
significance of the appearance of the lead from its previous association with being 
taken for a walk soon after.  This semiotic learning is the basis of the dog’s knowledge, 
whether this be knowing-how, knowing-wh, or knowing-that.  But as we know, and as 
perhaps the dog comes to know, signs are not always reliable, and on occasion may 
lack their usual significance.  For the dog, this might prompt a more nuanced 
recognition of signs: a clever dog might learn to recognise when appearance of the lead 
betokens a walk and when it doesn’t.  In this case it may on occasion be correctly said 
to know that despite the lead’s appearance, there will be no walk.  
Here I have been speaking again of anticipation, but in this case anticipation 
mediated by memory.  Earlier I discussed three biologically fundamental ways in 
which biosemiosis may be deemed anticipatory: (1) constitutively, as prospective 
activity or project; (2) in potentially contributing to system continuance and viability; 
and (3) through evolution, with respect to a system’s reproduction and contribution to 
a viable lineage.    However, cognitively higher-level biosemiosis may be anticipatory 
in either of two further ways: either (4) in the manner of a nuanced production-system 
(an algorithmic or quasi-algorithmic system of “rules” for action, nuanced to 
differences in sensory input, and in that sense selectively anticipating possibilities); or 
(5) in the familiar manner of representational-conceptual modelling of possibilities and 
their prospective implications.  Both (4) and (5) of course rely on appropriate 
biosemiotic subsystems of memory.  
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(d)  Biosemiosis and epistemological values  
It may seem odd that all knowledge, even knowledge of the past, is always, in some 
measure, semiotically prospective and anticipatory.  However, we should bear in 
mind that epistemology itself is always a system of values, and as such is normatively 
prospective.  Regard for the epistemological values of truth, systematic consistency, 
evidence, likelihood, heuristic fruitfulness, testing of theory and conjecture, cogency of 
reasoning – in short, regard for justification – has consequences for how we should be 
and for what we should do and think, now and in the future.  But what is most 
illuminating here is that these values have emerged, both naturally and culturally, 
from developments of the inherent valuational character of biosemiosis itself.  The 
inherently prospective, anticipatory character of biosemiosis is, eo ipso, its valuational 
character also.  This is because the causal character of biosemiosis is the foundation 
also of its functional character – that whereby system production, maintenance and 
viability are achieved – and functionality is inherently a value-concept as well as a 
causally descriptive concept.  In brief, survival is a value for living systems (even if 
only one value among others) and is achievable only through biosemiosis.  (For even 
when an organism seems to survive through “dumb luck”, the integrity and 
functioning of its organic sub-systems were maintained not by “dumb luck” but by 
biosemiotic communication and semiotically entrained processes of modulation.)  
This is explicitly acknowledged by virtually all biosemiotic theorists.  As the 
complexity of living systems evolved, so too their causal-functional systematicity 
became more complex, with the emergence of new epistemological functions 
essentially involving new forms of valuation (such as evaluations of likelihood, costs 
versus benefits, interpretive evaluation of linguistic meaning, and assessment of truth 
or falsity) that are the “point” of their emergent complex causality.   
(e)  Nuanced epistemological achievements, and nuanced epistemology   
We take it for granted that epistemology concerns a field of highly nuanced 
interpretation and evaluation; however the emergence of nuance is very much an 
evolutionary development.  Primitive semiosis was simply a matter of “triggered” 
activity, not one of nuanced discrimination or degree.  Nuanced evaluation emerged 
semiotically in sensitivity, perceptual discrimination, informed judgment, 
understanding and wisdom: all of them passages in the emergence of semiotic 
appreciation of systemic relationship – systemic because all nuance is essentially 
systemic.  (Otherwise, it would not be nuance, but merely a difference which made no 
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difference.54  All systems consist of relationships of enabling constraint: this is their 
essential functional character – and all systems, qua systems, are construed 
functionally.  What is enabled in a system is nuanced by systemic relationships of 
operative constraint; for enablement requires that a “trajectory” of the system, or of a 
sub-system, be constrained so that it is sufficiently robust and does not prematurely 
dissipate, and so that its contraries or opponents cannot yet prevail.)   
Appreciation – which is the name I shall give to this class of epistemological 
achievements (some “lower”, some “higher”) – is always nuanced and a matter of 
degree; it always pertains to features of systematicity, and is achieved through more or 
less systematic evaluation.  It is through appreciation of systematicity that 
epistemology itself is possible, since epistemology is evaluatively nuanced to 
‘differences that [systemically] make a difference’ cognitively.  However, epistemology 
is both a field of inquiry and (as here) a subject-matter of that very field.  There is no 
“view from nowhere” in this field; our understanding of our understanding is made 
possible by our noetic umwelt, and this understanding in turn may make possible further 
emergent meaning, and, through this, further development of our noetic umwelt – a 
view not from nowhere, but from our human noetic achievements and constraints.  
What makes these understandings possible is, ultimately, biosemiosis.  In short, our 
understanding is systemically constrained biosemiotically, and through our 
biosemiotically subserved semiotic enculturation.  But this does not mean we are 
“trapped” by current limitations of this umwelt; for like every complex system, it is a 
system of enabling constraint, and like every emergent system, it is emergently self-
organising, which in this context means that it yields new understandings, new 
appreciations, new illuminations and new insights that both critique and extend that 
umwelt, and which may even facilitate its transformation or transcendence.55   
8.  CONCLUSION  
(a)  Summary of my argument  
I have argued that it is through semiosis that nature makes knowledge, and indeed all 
epistemological achievements, possible; and that it is specifically biosemiosis which 
makes possible the emergent hierarchical self-organization of all forms of life, and 
54 Cf. G. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and 
Epistemology, Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1972. 
55 On cognitive transformation, see esp. R. Kegan, In Over Our Heads: The Mental Demands of Modern Life, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994, and R. Kegan, ‘What “Form” Transforms?  A 
Constructive-Developmental Perspective on Transformational Learning’, in J. Mezirow and Associates 
(eds), Learning as Transformation: Critical Perspectives on a Theory in Progress, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000.  
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through this the living systems and abilities which underlie those epistemological 
achievements.  Central to my argument has been an examination of the distinctive 
causal/functional character of biosemiosis which I have identified as its “signature” – 
a defining sign of its presence and operation.  Specifically, I aimed to show how 
nature’s “inventions” of non-linear causation and cybernetic process-modulation led 
to the emergence of semiotic systems at ‘the edge of chaos’, whose responsiveness to 
ultra-low-energy signals radically enhances their viability by instigating a non-linear 
cascade of adaptive activity peculiarly associated with the signal type, and how this 
made possible the emergence of hierarchically structured, biosemiotically modulated, 
self-organising living systems.  In light of that discussion I have essayed a moderately 
detailed, if inevitably somewhat speculative understanding of the causal/functional 
roles of biosemiosis in epistemological emergence and cognitive evolution.  My entire 
argument is naturalistically conceived in a pragmatic spirit which acknowledges that 
the inquirer, the process of inquiry, and its outcomes are inevitably implicated in the 
subject-matter of inquiry.  Like all fields of inquiry, epistemology inevitably constitutes 
a noetic umwelt; but in considering itself reflexively (as in the foregoing discussion) and 
submitting itself to pragmatic testing, it too is part of the long and wonderful process 
of natural/cultural emergence through which life raises itself by its own semiotic 
“bootstraps”.  
(b)  Three objections forestalled  
That, in essence, was my positive argument.  However, here I shall complete my 
argument by forestalling three possible objections based on misconstruals of my 
position.   
(1)  First, I want to stress my disavowal of ontological and epistemological 
reductionism, and to respond to the possible objection that despite that disavowal my 
account is ultimately reductionist.  I am not arguing that life or biosemiosis reduces to 
the physically constituted causal patterning which is the latter’s causal signature: 
rather, I hold that “signature” to be the distinctive sign of the emergent systemic-functional 
self-organization which is biosemiosis.  My ontological perspective is not that of 
reductive physicalism; rather, I hold emergent process-organization to be 
ontologically real and irreducible.  With Bickhard and Campbell,56 I hold emergent 
causality – emergent enabling constraint – to be the hallmark of all ontologically 
significant emergence.  In the natural emergence of semiosis, emergent causality 
makes possible naturally emergent function (and dysfunction) as Bickhard and 
56 Bickhard & Campbell, op. cit.  
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Campbell note.57  Naturally emergent functional organization is not reducible to the 
physical processes subserving it, because it essentially constitutes ontologically 
emergent forms of constraint (systemic boundary conditions) on the trajectories of 
subserving physical processes.58  Neither is it reducible to forms of lower-level 
functional organization on which its emergence depends, since it constrains at least 
some of that lower-level organization.59  Thus I am not proposing or presupposing 
any sort of ontological reductionism.  Furthermore, I concur with the view of 
biosemiotic theorists, and of many – possibly most – biologists, that the life sciences 
would be impossible were they to eschew all functional description and functional 
explanation, and that any explicit attempt to do so inevitably leads either to implicit 
functional assumptions or to incoherence.  Thus, in holding that emergent natural 
function achieved through emergent causality is irreducible to lower-level function or 
lower-level causality, I am also repudiating epistemological reductionism in the life 
sciences.  Given the foregoing, I hope it is clear that in no way am I proposing a 
reductionist epistemology either.   
(2)  Second, I want to clarify my position regarding the concepts of life and artificial 
life, viewed from a biosemiotic perspective, by anticipating and answering the 
following possible objection.  Suppose it were objected that my view of biosemiotic 
theory entails that an inexpensive personal computer, since it has an hierarchical 
functional architecture, and is systemically responsive to minute inputs of energy, 
which its programming may allow to systemically entrain a non-linear cascade of 
hierarchically realized processes, therefore must be deemed (absurdly) a living being 
since its operation exhibits the distinctive causal “signature” of biosemiosis.  The basis 
of my response to this alleged entailment is that it completely misrepresents my 
position.  Biosemiosis occurs only in the dynamic regime of the ‘edge of chaos’ – this 
being crucial for the forms of emergent self-organization by which it is embodied.  
Everyday computers are not of this sort, and, to my knowledge, no human-engineered 
computers of this sort exist.  If they did or do exist, they would be very different 
machines from those with which we are familiar.  The whole point and nature of 
biosemiosis is its production of emergent self-organization of the peculiar and complex 
type I have described.  It is not that biosemiosis simply relies on prior such 
emergence; rather, it is its nature also to produce the systems which produce it.  This is 
the nature of life itself.  If this were achieved by a specialized computer adapted to, 
and functioning at the edge of chaos, then this in my view would indeed be semiosis 
57 Ibid.  
58 See e.g. Deacon, op. cit., esp. Chs 5&6. 
59 Deacon, op. cit.  
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properly-so-called.  (Note too that in these circumstances, the argument of Searle’s 
“Chinese-Room” thought-experiment – to the effect that a (syntactically) rule-
governed computer cannot achieve understanding60 – would not apply, since Searle’s 
argument is implicitly restricted to systems in which self-organized emergence cannot 
occur.)  And if an emergently self-organizing computer, and/or its subsystems, were 
able to maintain and reproduce itself/themselves and thereby establish a semiotic 
community, I see no reason for denying such systems the status of artificial life – 
particularly as their functioning would exemplify autopoiesis.  This is not in the least a 
problem for my account, and is a very different scenario from that adverted to by my 
hypothetical objector.   
(3)  Finally, there is an argument of von Neumann, elaborated by Howard Pattee 
with regard to its significance for the physics of biosemiosis,61 which might be thought 
to invalidate two aspects of my account of biosemiosis – viz. non-representational 
biosemiotic anticipation, and the first emergence of reproduction in primitive 
biosemiotic systems.  Von Neumann’s argument is to the conclusion that necessarily 
(i.e. as a matter of logic) for a system to be capable of self-replication and open-ended 
evolution it must be able to adequately model its own systems and their functioning 
symbolically.  Pattee elaborates on the argument’s implications for biological self-
repair and reproduction, and for the establishment of evolutionary lineages.62  I will 
not sketch either argument, as, given their respective presuppositions, I accept both.  
What I do not accept is that their presuppositions are apt for all biosemiotic, 
reproducing systems.  Essentially (although this is not made explicit in either account) 
the presuppositions of both arguments pertain only to autopoietic self-reproduction; 
however, natural autopoietic systems are in fact only a proper sub-class of biosemiotic 
systems.  Autopoeisis emerges in nature only at higher levels of complexity than do 
primitive semiosis and non-representational biosemiosis.  Von Neumann’s and 
Pattee’s arguments apply only to systems whose reproduction is unaided by their 
environments (except insofar as their environments supply energy and raw materials) – 
in short, autopoeitic systems.  They do not acknowledge that in primitive cases, in 
favourable environments, essential sub-tasks involved in reproduction might be 
“performed” by a system’s environment in the absence of semiotic modelling of that 
which is reproduced.  The simplest such sub-tasks might be splitting-off of sub-systems 
and/or capture of other systems or (split-off) sub-systems, where the splitting is caused 
by environmental buffeting or chemically produced fracture, and capture is fortuitous 
60 J. Searle, ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 3, no. 3, 1980, pp. 417-457. 
61 H.H. Pattee, ‘The Physics of Symbols and the Evolution of Semiotic Controls’, in D. Favareau (ed.), 
Essential Readings in Biosemiotics, Springer Netherlands, 2009, Ch.17.  
62 Ibid.  
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or mediated by natural currents or fields of attraction.  Environmental perturbation, 
whether mechanical, electromagnetic or chemical, might also alter processes internal 
to a system.  Environmentally produced alterations of any of these types might need 
to happen many times before a biosemiotically mediated system was fortuitously 
duplicated, but given a sufficiently rich (and perhaps changing) environment of 
polymeric activity, and given the role of semiosis in maintenance of (sub-)system 
viability, this need not be thought implausible.  Indeed, it seems to me most plausible.  
(What seems to me implausible is the assumption that reproduction was impossible 
prior to the emergence of complex symbolic codes necessary for modelling system 
reproduction and the intricately nuanced mediatory functioning of such modelling.  
For this would seem to make the natural emergence of autopoeisis scarcely less than a 
miracle.)  It is salutary to remember here that no complex system – and thus no 
semiotically mediated system – is ever adequately understood apart from its 
interactions with its environment.   
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